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Sida).1. INTRODUCTION
Signiﬁcant volumes of foreign aid have been channeled to
developing countries for more than four decades. Not surpris-
ingly, a large literature considers aid eﬀectiveness particularly
from the perspective of the impact of aid on aggregate eco-
nomic growth. While Rajan and Subramanian (2008) ﬁnd no
systematic evidence that aid has contributed to economic
growth, the weight of evidence is shifting to a positive contri-
bution of aid to growth. Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010a)
employ the same approach and raw data as Rajan and Subr-
amanian (2008). After strengthening the prediction of supply
side variation in aid, including correction for a misinterpreta-
tion of OECD/DAC bilateral aid data, they ﬁnd a positive
long run eﬀect of aid on growth which lies in the domain pre-
dicted by neo-classical growth theory (e.g., Solow, 1956).
Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani, and Bazzi (2012) revisit the
dynamic panel evidence, focusing on aid that is expected to
have an “early impact” on growth—e.g., via infrastructure
development. The authors conclude that: “[such] aid inﬂows
are systematically associated with modest, positive subsequent
growth in cross-country panel data”. (p. 23). More recently,
Frot and Perrotta (2012) suggest a new instrument for aid
identiﬁed by the timing of the initiation of bilateral aid rela-
tionships. They come to a similar conclusion that foreign aid
is associated with a moderate growth bonus. Finally, time ser-
ies evidence for a range of African countries (Juselius, Møller,
& Tarp, 2013) support a view that aid has played a positive
aggregate developmental role in most instances; and meta-
analysis of the aid–growth relation leads to a similar conclu-
sion (Mekasha & Tarp, 2013). This macro-level evidence
comes on top of meso- and micro-level evidence that has long
been viewed as broadly positive (Mosley, 1987; see also
Mishra & Newhouse, 2009; Riddell, 2007; Temple, 2010).
However, despite increasing evidence that meso-level out-
comes can add up to substantial macroeconomic eﬀects6(Cohen & Soto, 2007), these micro- and meso-level ﬁndings
have not been deployed to argue that aid is eﬀective on aggre-
gate (one exception is Sachs, 2006).
In this article we aim to provide a broader assessment of aid
eﬀectiveness. While a focus on the eﬀect of aid on macroeco-
nomic growth is necessary, it is not suﬃcient. A growing
literature considers the contribution of aid in speciﬁc social
sectors, such as education. Indeed, many outcomes are valued
independently of their contribution to growth. Access to “merit
goods,” such as basic health care and primary education, are
viewed as essential human rights and fundamental to the devel-
opment process. Accordingly, these outcomes should be
included when considering the accomplishments of aid.
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Figure 1. General causal diagram summarizing the linkages between aid and
ﬁnal outcomes. Notes: This ﬁgure is a simpliﬁed causal directed acyclic
graph (DAG) of the relationship between aid (a) and aggregate outcomes
(y), via intermediate outcomes (X); v is a single exogenous determinant of
aid; u terms are unobserved, possibly errors; solid lines represent directed
relationships between observed variables; broken lines represent directed
relations due to unobserved variables (errors).
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aid–growth relationship in three further ways. First, we extend
the analysis of Arndt et al. (2010a) by adding 7 years of more
recent data to the series. Second, we investigate the consis-
tency of the growth evidence with changes in other domains,
particularly proximate determinants of growth, thus providing
a coherence test for the aid–growth relationship. If no robust
evidence of a relationship can be found between aid and
important growth determinants such as investment and
human capital, then the impact of foreign aid on growth
becomes much harder to explain. Third, consideration of a
wide range of alternative outcomes also provides a means to
validate the robustness of the methods employed to address
the likely endogeneity of aid.
As with many empirical questions in the economics litera-
ture, studying aid eﬀectiveness is beset by diﬃculties in deter-
mining causality. In order to address these challenges, we
outline a general framework that clariﬁes aid’s potential role
in contributing both to intermediate outcomes (e.g., human
capital accumulation) and ﬁnal outcomes (e.g., growth). The
model also indicates how these eﬀects can be identiﬁed from
observational data and precisely what feasible empirical esti-
mates will capture. The empirical analysis is then pursued in
four steps: we (i) calculate reduced form estimates of the
impact of aid on a range of ﬁnal economic outcomes (growth,
poverty, inequality, and structural change); (ii) apply the same
reduced form approach to a set of intermediate economic out-
comes (such as investment, consumption, and tax take) as well
as social outcomes (such as health and education); (iii) run a
set of sensitivity and falsiﬁcation tests; and (iv) interpret the
economic magnitude of the ﬁndings as well as their consis-
tency with previous literature. In presenting a broader assess-
ment, this analysis responds, at least in part, to the challenge
set forth by Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) to unpack
the causal chain from aid to ﬁnal outcomes.
We ﬁnd no evidence that nearly 40 years of development
assistance has had an overall detrimental eﬀect on develop-
ment outcomes. Rather, a coherent and favorable picture
emerges. Aid has promoted structural change, reduced pov-
erty, and stimulated growth. Aid also has supported proxi-
mate growth determinants, in particular by building human
and physical capital. This does not mean that aid works well
at all times and in all places. Also, the impact of aid is no
doubt heterogeneous. Nevertheless, these ﬁndings are consis-
tent with signiﬁcant strands of the existing literature and
add further weight to the conclusion that, while perhaps less
potent than initially hoped and certainly not a panacea, aid
has registered signiﬁcant accomplishments in helping to
achieve development goals.2. METHODOLOGY
(a) Analytical framework
A variety of approaches have been developed to address
questions of economic causality. These issues are at the core
of assessing the impact of aid and are reﬂected in the ongoing
debate concerning the suitability of the various instruments
for aid that have been employed in the literature (see Clemens
&Bazzi, 2009). A useful starting point for thinking about these
issues is a graphical depiction of the principal (generic) impact
channels assumed to be at play. A simple version of this is pro-
vided in Figure 1, which is inspired by the directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs) that are central to the Structural Causal
Model (SCM) approach to analyzing causality due to Pearl(2009) (inter alia). 1 Solid lines in the ﬁgure represent directed
relationships between observed variables, which themselves
are depicted by the nodes (circles). Dotted lines represent
eﬀects emanating from unobserved variables (u), which can
be thought of as composite error terms. Consequently, the ﬁg-
ure assumes that aid (a) aﬀects a single ﬁnal outcome such as
income (y) through a vector of intermediate outcomes (X). 2 In
this and the subsequent discussion, it is helpful to think of
intermediate outcomes as component inputs in a generic pro-
duction function for ﬁnal outcomes. In the case of income,
these would be so-called proximate sources of growth such
as physical and human capital inputs (see Mankiw, Romer,
& Weil, 1992).
As depicted in the ﬁgure, a fundamental problem of identi-
fying the causal impact of aid arises because the unobserved
error terms are correlated. In the language of the SCM
approach, there are “backdoor paths” running between a
and X ; y. The implication is that estimates of any of the rela-
tionships a ! X ; a ! y or X ! y may be biased. Speciﬁcally,
this can come about due to simultaneity or other forms of
omitted variables bias, even when a set of conditioning vari-
ables is included (not depicted in the ﬁgure). Measurement
error in the aid variable, as explicitly acknowledged by the
OECD who compile the data, is a further challenge that can
lead to attenuation bias. 3 A potential solution to these prob-
lems arises when one or more instrumental variables such as v
is observed. As shown in the ﬁgure, this represents a parent
(ancestor node) of aid and has an error structure that is unre-
lated to the error structure of any other variables, indicated by
the absence of arcs to any of the other unobserved error terms.
It is important to understand what can and cannot be iden-
tiﬁed when a source of external variation such as v is available.
First, any of the individual relationships between aid and spe-
ciﬁc intermediate outcomes (elements of X) can be identiﬁed
through separate reduced form models. In these cases the
intermediate outcomes are taken as the dependent variable
to be explained. Second, assuming the same broad model is
valid for other ﬁnal outcomes—i.e., a generic production func-
tion approach with similar proximate inputs is appropriate—
then alternative outcomes can be identiﬁed in addition to y.
For any chosen dependent variable, the ratio of the relation-
ships v ! y to v ! a, suitably adjusted for other covariates,
would correspond to an instrumental variables estimator for
the eﬀect a ! y. This corresponds to what Angrist and Pischke
(2008) refer to as the ratio of estimates from “long” and
“short” regressions. Appendix A provides a more formal
exposition of these ideas.
All estimates of the kind described above should be seen as
reduced forms precisely because they may capture impacts
through a wide variety of channels (e.g., multiple elements
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composition of these channels. Reduced form estimates do
not control for the potentially complex pattern of interactions
between intermediate outcomes, as well as reverse feedback
(e.g., from ﬁnal outcomes to intermediate outcomes). To give
an example, aid may have a positive eﬀect on household
income through a variety of channels such as public invest-
ment. Aid may also have a direct positive eﬀect on education
(e.g., by funding school-building and teacher training) but also
an indirect eﬀect via higher incomes. A reduced form estimate
of the aid ! education relationship would not distinguish
between these direct and indirect eﬀects due to aid. As a con-
sequence, one cannot simply add up estimates from diﬀerent
reduced form results to get a “total” eﬀect of aid.
In contrast to a reduced form approach, a structural form
model would aim to isolate these direct eﬀects in order gain
insight into the structure of relationships between multiple
variables. In the present case, estimation of the structural form
would require multiple instrumental variables to control for
unobserved correlation between intermediate and ﬁnal out-
comes, as well as a precise understanding of the form of inter-
actions between intermediate variables (for elaboration see
Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2011). Finding a host of valid instru-
mental variables for outcomes such as education and health
is controversial (arguably, more so than for foreign aid; see
Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007). Thus, in the present exercise
we focus uniquely on reduced form estimates. Thus, we leave
for future research the issue of exploring the details of the
interconnections between aid, intermediate outcomes, and
ﬁnal outcomes.
(b) Estimation strategy
The previous sub-section argued that the eﬀect of aid on a
broad range of ﬁnal and intermediate outcomes can be esti-
mated via a series of (separate) reduced form regression mod-
els. Following Figure 1, one beneﬁt of this approach is that the
same instrument for aid can be used in each model. It follows
that this instrument plays a crucial role and must be selected
with care. Our point of departure is earlier work published
in Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010b), hereafter abbreviated to
AJT10. In AJT10 we generated an external instrument for
aid (per capita) from a model of its supply-side determinants
at the donor-recipient level. This was developed as a modiﬁca-
tion of the instrument proposed by Rajan and Subramanian
(2008), which in turn was inspired by the earlier contribution
of Tavares (2003).
We adopt the same strategy here. As in AJT10 we specify a
supply-side model for aid as follows:
Aiddr=POPr ¼ b0 þ b1COLONYr þ b2 logðPOPd=POPrÞ
þ b3COLONYr  logðPOPd=POPrÞ
þ b4CURCOLdr þ b5COMLANGdr
þ hdDONORd þ dr ð1Þ
where d indexes donors, r recipient countries; CURCOL is a
dummy variable taking the value of one if the recipient country
is currently a colony of the donor; COLONY is a dummy var-
iable taking the value of one if the recipient country was ever a
colony (of any country); COMLANG is a dummy variable tak-
ing the value of one if the recipient country has a language in
common with the donor; POP is population size; and DONOR
are donor ﬁxed eﬀects. In AJT10 the variables entering this
model were averaged over the same periods considered by
Rajan and Subramanian (2008), with the preferred speciﬁca-tion referring to 1970–2000. In the present study we take
advantage of new data and extend the period of interest to
2007 (i.e., up to the start of the global ﬁnancial crisis).
Predicted aid receipts from this model are aggregated upward
by recipient to give a total predicted aid inﬂow for each
country over the period. This variable, denoted as
v^r ¼
P
dð ^Aiddr=POPrÞ, constitutes the generated instrument
for aid.
The remaining aspects of our empirical approach can be set
out in general form as follows:
ar ¼ c0 þ c1v^r þ T 0rc2 þ gr ð2Þ
yr ¼ d0 þ d1a^r þ T 0rd2 þ er ð3Þ
Eqn. (2) is the familiar ﬁrst-stage of a two-stage least squares
system, where ar refers to the aid variable of interest, assumed
endogenous; v^r is a source of exogenous variation in aid,
described above; and T r is a vector of additional control vari-
ables for initial conditions. Eqn. (3) is the second-stage equa-
tion, where d1 constitutes the eﬀect of aid on the outcome of
interest (y), which is identiﬁed assuming the generated aid
instrument is relevant and mean-independent of the outcome
error term—i.e., we require EðejT ; v^Þ ¼ EðeÞ ¼ 0. Eqn. (3) also
can be recognized as a reduced form model of the eﬀect of aid
on the outcome. This is because the system does not specify
the intermediate channels through which aid aﬀects the out-
come. Consequently, estimates for d1 refer to the total eﬀect
of aid regardless of the channels or pathways through which
this comes about.
Following the previous discussion, a range of outcome vari-
ables can be used to represent y. In so doing, and presuming
that the same set of control variables (T) are employed, then
the ﬁrst stage regression will not change, meaning that the
strength of the instrument will also remain the same. However,
since the instrument is derived from observational data and the
“true” set of exogenous background variables (such as initial
conditions) is unknown, there is no guarantee that the instru-
ment will be valid in all cases. Put diﬀerently, as the instrument
does not derive from a randomized design, there may be some
outcomes for which e is not independent of v^ or T. Conse-
quently, a metric of instrument validity would be of use.
As shown in the above system of equations, only a single
excluded instrument for aid is employed in the ﬁrst stage. This
means that over-identiﬁcation tests cannot be employed. To
get around this constraint, we replicate the tests employed in
AJT10, whereby aggregated versions of the underlying sup-
ply-side variables used to generate the aid instrument are
employed directly as the instruments in the ﬁrst stage (aggre-
gate-level) regressions. Speciﬁcally, we employ the ﬁrst three
terms on the RHS of Eqn. (1) namely, relative population
sizes, a dummy for whether the (recipient) country was ever
a colony, and their interaction term. Hansen/Sargan tests
deriving from the same instrumental variables regressions as
above, but now using the disaggregated instrument set, thus
provide some insight as to instrument validity. Although such
tests should only be considered indicative, the point is that the
overall coherence of our results derive from a consideration of
the impact of aid (and the suitability of our instrument) over a
broad range of outcomes. Thus, in contrast to earlier work, an
important contribution of the present analysis is that it does
not rely exclusively on the relationship between the aid instru-
ment and a single outcome. If the aid–growth results of Arndt
et al. (2010a) were driven by an invalid or weak instrument,
then our use here of an updated dataset and consideration
of alternative outcome variables provides ample opportunities
to expose these properties.
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tant practical decisions need to be made. First is the question
of the time period over which causal eﬀects are to be esti-
mated. A large part of the modern aid–growth literature has
employed panel data, focusing on relatively short term eﬀects
of up to 5 years. However, there are good reasons to believe
that the impact of developmental aid is cumulative and long-
term in nature. This notion is captured in Woolcock’s meta-
phorical distinction between growing sunﬂowers versus oak
trees (Woolcock, 2009, 2011; also Temple, 2010). For instance,
the impact of aid that ﬁnances an expansion of access to edu-
cation may only be visible in aggregate indicators of education
outcomes after a signiﬁcant proportion of the population has
passed through the education system. In turn, individuals
must complete their education and then ﬁnd work for this
expansion to have a measurable eﬀect on growth. This implies
there may be a very long lag between receiving aid and being
able to distinguish any form of aggregate eﬀects.
One way to address this challenge, adopted by Clemens
et al. (2012), is to restrict the analytical focus to the eﬀects
of “early impact” aid on growth. By construction, this
excludes aid toward many key areas, including the social sec-
tors, and presumes that a clear distinction can be made (theo-
retically and empirically) between diﬀerent types of aid ﬂows.
Other analysts have focused on the eﬀect of speciﬁc types of
aid on narrower outcomes such as education. However, both
of these approaches have their drawbacks. Aid given to a spe-
ciﬁc sector (objective) may not exclusively aﬀect outcomes
within that sector (objective). For instance, aid to education
may well bring health-related beneﬁts (and vice versa). Sec-
tor-speciﬁc measures of aid are also problematic due to diﬃ-
culties in attributing multi-sector funds to individual sectors,
thereby adding to measurement error concerns. Moreover,
OECD-DAC data regarding aid disbursements at the sector
level are only available for a small number of recent years.
This means that over longer time horizons it is necessary to
impute sector-speciﬁc disbursement data from data on aid
commitments, the values of which are known to diverge signif-
icantly both for individual aid components and in total
(Odedokun, 2003).
In light of these issues, as well as our objective of taking a
broad view of aid eﬀectiveness, we focus on the cumulative
eﬀects of aid for a cross-section of countries over the 1970–
2007 period. In doing so we do not restrict our focus to speciﬁc
types of aid, nor to speciﬁc types of outcomes. Due to con-
cerns regarding the quality of sector-speciﬁc aid data, we only
use aggregate measures of aid (speciﬁcally, net aid disburse-
ments). We recognize that this measure is imperfect and masks
substantial diﬀerences in both aid quality and development
intentions. However, this measure of aid is transparent and
allows for fungibility between sectors. In addition, we dispense
with a dynamic panel approach and consider only the long-run
static eﬀect of aid. To do so, the principal variables in Eqns.
(2) and (3) (namely, aid and the chosen outcome) are mea-
sured in terms of their average values for the full period.
Admittedly, the choice of this period may be sub-optimal.
The period 1970–2007 could represent an insuﬃcient or exces-
sive window of time to fully capture the eﬀect of aid for some
outcomes. However, as we are not aware of any optimal win-
dow, we consider 1970–2007 suﬃciently “long” to count as the
long-run and use all available information over this period in
taking period averages for the aid and outcome variables.
It should be emphasized that this long-run averaging proce-
dure applies only to the outcomes and aid inputs speciﬁed in
Eqns. (2) and (3). Background control variables, denoted by
T, are measured at their observed value in 1970, or the nearestavailable data point. The reason for this is that it avoids con-
founding the impact of aid with eﬀects that occur contempora-
neously through other intermediate variables. That is, in the
language of SCM, we make sure not to block any pathways
through which aid may inﬂuence the outcome of interest.
For a small number of chosen outcomes (e.g., for education
and health), however, observations are scarce in the early
years of the 1970–2007 period, but increase over time. In order
to avoid the long period average being dominated by more
recent observations, in these cases we use a simple arithmetic
mean of the earliest and latest observations, thereby assuming
a linear trend over time. In a few other cases (e.g., for poverty
rates), data are unavailable in the 1970s and early 1980s. Here
we deﬁne the dependent variable as the endpoint level
(Appendix B lists the variables to which this applies). 4
A separate issue concerns the scale used to measure aid in
Eqn. (2). Raw values are not informative due to diﬀerences
in income and population between countries. One option is
to scale total aid received by a given country (over time) by
its population size, suggesting per capita aid as the “treat-
ment” variable of interest. This is an intuitive measure and
is technically appealing as many intermediate outcomes are
expressed in population terms (e.g., average years of school-
ing, life expectancy). However, aid per capita has speciﬁc
limitations compared to the use of the aid to GDP ratio
(Aid/GDP), which has been more commonly deployed in the
literature to date. First, it is hard to give a sensible or clear
interpretation to any estimated eﬀect of aid per capita on
key macroeconomic outcomes, where variables are often mea-
sured in terms of or scaled by GDP. For instance, suppose we
ﬁnd that an inﬂow of US$10 of aid per capita causes the GDP
growth rate to rise by 1 percentage point. Although this may
be of interest per se, the problem is that the implied beneﬁt–
cost ratio is ambiguous because it depends on the initial size
of the economy. Second, it is reasonable to assume that the
real cost of providing a given ﬂow of public services, such as
education, tends to increase with GDP. Thus, especially over
long time frames, the relative purchasing power of aid over
a wide range of outcomes is best considered in economic
terms, not population terms. 5 For these reasons, unless noted
otherwise, we employ Aid/GDP as the measure of aid.
A large number of variables might be considered candidates
for inclusion as either ﬁnal or intermediate outcomes. 6 How-
ever, data availability and computational limitations mean
that some exclusions must be imposed ex ante. With respect
to ﬁnal outcomes, we focus on growth, poverty, inequality,
and the sectoral composition of value added. The ﬁrst three
of these variables are intimately connected (see Bourguignon,
2003); therefore, we should expect to see a consistent pattern
of eﬀects across them. The remaining variables capture the
extent of changes across diﬀerent macroeconomic sectors
(agriculture, industry, and services). Historical experiences
indicate that sustained growth transitions are normally associ-
ated with a declining share of agriculture and a rising share of
industry in value added. At the same time, there are concerns
that aid may provoke Dutch Disease, which is often associated
with faster growth in service sectors than manufactures (e.g.,
Rajan & Subramanian, 2011). By including these variables,
we hope to gain insight into whether aid is associated with
speciﬁc growth challenges.
For intermediate outcomes, a number of “usual suspects”
emerge from previous literature. These fall into the following
groups: (i) sub-components of GDP (investment, private con-
sumption, and government consumption); (ii) components of
government revenue and spending; (iii) aggregate education
and health outcomes (e.g., average years of schooling, life
10 WORLD DEVELOPMENTexpectancy); and (iv) monetary and ﬁnancial sector eﬀects. A
number of variables from each category is employed in the
reduced form analysis, thus providing coverage over a wide
range of meso-level aid eﬀects. Details of the speciﬁc variables
and sources of data are given in Appendix B.
Finally, to assist comparison of estimated eﬀects across dif-
ferent outcomes, the aid and outcome variables all enter the
models in standardized form, meaning that they are linearly
transformed to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
Also, to maintain comparability with previous research, we
use the same sample of 78 developing countries and the same
set of control variables as in AJT10. The only exception is that
we include a dummy for being an oil producer in 1960. This
variable was included in robustness tests in AJT10 but is
now treated as part of our core speciﬁcation due to the exten-
sion of the dataset from 2000–07, which includes a period of
rapid economic growth in oil-producing countries, driven by
rising oil prices. That is, it controls for the spike in growth
rates in the latter period for a small sub-group of countries.3. RESULTS
This section describes the results of the modeling exercise, as
well as those of a number of auxiliary sensitivity and falsiﬁca-Table 1. Estimates of reduced form relatio
OLS LIML IPWLS
(I) (II) (III)
Aid/GDP 0.115 0.639* 0.612**
(0.073) (0.382) (0.288)
Aid per capita (PPP) – – –
GDP per capita (PPP) 0.713*** 0.318 0.345
(0.146) (0.245) (0.233)
Primary schooling 0.146 0.158 0.243
(0.466) (0.516) (0.450)
Trade policy index 0.768*** 0.693** 0.699***
(0.224) (0.278) (0.262)
Life expectancy 0.034* 0.058** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.024) (0.021)
Geography 0.082 0.102 0.123
(0.105) (0.122) (0.102)
Coastal pop. dens. 0.037*** 0.035** 0.043***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.016)
Malaria prevalence 0.957*** 1.190*** 1.077*** 
(0.261) (0.390) (0.315)
Civil liberties 0.051 0.344 0.385
(0.269) (0.389) (0.321)
Air distance 0.259 0.344* 0.394**
(0.180) (0.205) (0.199)
Oil producer 0.438** 0.912*** 1.009***
(0.178) (0.283) (0.215)
N 78 78 78
R2 (centered) 0.74 0.54 0.55
Weak id. statistic 9.16 12.13
Anderson–Rubin test 0.02 0.01
Endogeneity test 0.012 0.018
Notes: Dependent variable is real GDP growth; intercept, investment prices, an
in standardized form; columns I and V estimated by OLS; columns II and VI es
VII replicate the latter with IPWLS; columns IV and VIII use three instrume
single aid instrument; ﬁnal two rows report probabilities; endogeneity test is D
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions and so
* Signiﬁcance: 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance: 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance: 0.01.tion tests. A more detailed interpretation of results is given in
Section 4.
(a) Reduced form
In presenting the main results, we focus on reporting esti-
mates of the eﬀect of aid on a range of development outcomes.
Thus, estimates for other variables in Eqn. (3) are not dis-
cussed at length. 7 Even so, since the same RHS speciﬁcation
is used throughout, Table 1 reports more detailed regression
estimates for the eﬀect of aid on average real growth per capita
(1970–2007). The table reports results using our preferred
measure of aid, Aid/GDP (columns I–IV), as well as for
(PPP adjusted) real aid per capita (columns V–VIII). Diﬀerent
columns apply diﬀerent regression estimators and/or sets of
instruments for aid. Focusing on the Aid/GDP results, column
(I) uses an OLS estimator, which ignores the potential endoge-
neity of aid and just employs its observed values; column (II) is
a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator;
and column (III) is an inverse probability weighted least
squares (IPWLS) estimator. Column (IV) directly employs as
excluded instruments for aid three principal variables used
to generate the supply-side aid instrument (now aggregated).
This allows Hansen/Sargan tests to be applied (not reported
in the table; see further below).n between aid and growth, 1970–2007
LIML OLS LIML IPWLS LIML
(IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
0.432* – – – –
(0.249)
– 0.058 0.299** 0.228** 0.239**
(0.072) (0.138) (0.111) (0.120)
0.426** 0.663*** 0.704*** 0.698*** 0.694***
(0.185) (0.138) (0.133) (0.130) (0.128)
0.155 0.140 0.110 0.237 0.118
(0.470) (0.456) (0.414) (0.397) (0.404)
0.714*** 0.767*** 0.810*** 0.797*** 0.799***
(0.244) (0.229) (0.213) (0.194) (0.208)
0.052*** 0.037** 0.036** 0.036** 0.036**
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
0.097 0.102 0.172* 0.173* 0.155
(0.112) (0.109) (0.095) (0.091) (0.100)
0.035** 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.042***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
1.127*** 1.008*** 1.069*** 0.921*** 1.054***
(0.325) (0.275) (0.281) (0.237) (0.267)
0.263 0.158 0.415 0.393 0.351
(0.323) (0.280) (0.330) (0.264) (0.317)
0.320* 0.279 0.306* 0.334** 0.299*
(0.192) (0.183) (0.171) (0.169) (0.166)
0.783*** 0.527*** 0.593*** 0.675*** 0.577***
(0.218) (0.165) (0.157) (0.127) (0.149)
78 78 78 78 78
0.64 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.71
4.26 18.44 11.70 9.56
0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06
0.005 0.034 0.071 0.029
d region dummies included but not shown; growth and aid measures enter
timated by LIML, using a single generated aid instrument; columns III and
nts for aid taken from the zero stage regression employed to generate the
urbin–Wu–Hausman v2; standard errors (in parentheses) are robust.
urces.
ASSESSING FOREIGN AID’S LONG RUN CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 11The LIML and IPWLS estimators are both instrumental
variables estimators. The former is a standard alternative to
a two-stage least squares estimator and is numerically equiva-
lent where one excluded instrument is employed. However,
where the model is not just-identiﬁed (as in column IV) the
LIML estimator is known to be more robust to the presence
of weak instruments (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). The
IPWLS estimator, presented in detail in Arndt et al. (2010b),
instruments for aid but employs a binary aid instrument and
applies weights to the data giving greater emphasis to the part
of the empirical distribution of covariates where there is most
overlap between “high” and “low” aid recipients (according to
the instrument). This approach is “doubly robust” but has the
disadvantage of discarding valuable information and, there-
fore, may lead to an eﬃciency loss. Thus, it should be seen pri-
marily as a robustness check on the linearity assumption
underlying the LIML results. For all results employing instru-
mental variables, tests of instrument strength are reported.
The OLS results in Table 1 provide no evidence of a positive
impact of aid on growth. However, once the endogeneity of
aid is accounted for using instrumental variables techniques,
this conclusion is rejected and a positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant impact is found. Interpretation of the LIML point
estimates in column (II) for Aid/GDP are as follows: a one
standard deviation increase in Aid/GDP is expected to boost
growth by 0.64 standard deviations on average, holding all
other variables ﬁxed. One can translate this estimated eﬀect
to raw units by referring to the information in Appendix B.
This shows that a one standard deviation of the real GDP
growth rate equals 1.79 percentage points; and a one standard
deviation increase in Aid/GDP represents 3.77 percentage
points. Thus, an aid–growth eﬀect of 0.61 standard deviation
units implies a 0:64 ð1:79=3:77Þ ¼ 0:30 percentage point
eﬀect in raw terms. Put more simply, a one percentage point
increase in Aid/GDP is expected to boost the real GDP
growth rate by 0.30 percentage points. The IPWLS results
are essentially the same.
Before proceeding to consider other outcomes, three addi-
tional comments on the results in Table 1 can be made. First,
although the instrumental variables results are positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, the respective conﬁdence intervals are
relatively wide suggesting the eﬀect is not precisely estimated.
This is not a surprise given the nature of the data and sample
size. Nonetheless, a positive eﬀect of aid on growth is found
for both the Aid/GDP and aid per capita measures, giving cre-
dence to the ﬁndings. Indeed, when applied to the full range ofTable 2. Summary of reduced form results for rela
N OLS Pr. LIM
GDP per capita growth 78 0.115 0.12 0.63
Agriculture, value added (%GDP) 76 0.035 0.69 0.6
Industry, value added (% GDP) 76 0.220 0.10 0.64
Services, etc., value added (% GDP) 76 0.273 0.04** 0.24
Poverty headcount at $2 a day 64 0.018 0.84 0.4
Poverty headcount at $1.25 a day 64 0.084 0.57 0.4
Gini index 65 0.186 0.14 0.0
Notes: Each cell of columns OLS, LIML, and IPWLS reports the standardized
the row variable enters as the dependent variable; adjacent columns report
estimation method is indicated by the column headings; aid treated as endogeno
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test that aid can be treated as exogenous; “Hansen-J”
regression using three aggregated instruments; all regressions include the sam
Source: authors’ calculations; see Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions and sou
* Signiﬁcance: 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance: 0.05
*** Signiﬁcance: 0.01.intermediate and ﬁnal outcomes, use of aid per capita yields
highly consistent results with those presented here (for full
details see Arndt, Jones, & Tarp, 2011).
Second, instrument strength and validity tests give no cause
for concern. The Andersen–Rubin test, which is robust to
weak instruments, conﬁrms a statistically signiﬁcant partial
correlation between the endogenous variable (aid) and the out-
come (growth). Although they are not reported in the table,
Hansen-J tests calculated from the estimates in columns (IV)
and (VIII) are passed comfortably, supporting the validity of
the generated instrument. However, the weak identiﬁcation
(Kleibergen–Paap F) statistic shows that when three aggre-
gated instruments are used instead of a single generated instru-
ment, instrument strength declines. Thus, for interpretation we
focus on estimates from the LIML (and IPWLS) estimators
that employ a single instrument.
Third, coeﬃcient estimates for other covariates included in
the model are plausible. All of these refer to initial conditions
and are measured as the value in 1970 (or thereabouts). Thus,
the interpretation is that trade openness at the beginning of
the period is associated with more rapid subsequent growth,
and malaria prevalence in 1970 is associated with slower aver-
age growth. In the present speciﬁcation the estimate on the
level of GDP per capita represents a convergence eﬀect—the
negative sign indicates that lower income countries grow faster
on average. Inclusion of this term is appropriate because the
dependent variable here is measured in diﬀerences. For other
outcomes (see below), which are measured in levels, inclusion
of the initial level of the same variable on the RHS is not nec-
essary (e.g., see Acemoglu & Johnson, 2007; Bloom, Canning,
& Sevilla, 2004). However, as we retain the same speciﬁcation
throughout, the GDP level term simply acts to control for ini-
tial income.
The ﬁnding of a positive eﬀect of aid on growth is impor-
tant, but it raises equally critical distributional questions. To
make a contribution to development in a wider sense, eco-
nomic growth should beneﬁt poorer households. Thus it is rel-
evant to validate the eﬀect of aid on other aggregate welfare
outcomes. These are considered in Table 2, which summarizes
results from separate regressions for a chosen set of ﬁnal out-
comes. The same speciﬁcation and instrument (s) for aid are
employed as in Table 1; also, results are reported for each
the three main estimators employed before—OLS, LIML,
and IPWLS. 8 To assist interpretation, Aid/GDP and all out-
come variables are entered in standardized form. Thus, each
cell of Table 2 gives the standardized coeﬃcient on the aidtionships between Aid/GDP and ﬁnal outcomes
L Pr. IPWLS Pr. Endog. test Hansen-J
9 0.09* 0.612 0.03** 0.01.** 0.84
52 0.08* 1.062 0.01*** 0.03** 0.89
8 0.24 0.822 0.04** 0.42 0.68
2 0.56 0.634 0.23 0.19 0.65
71 0.05* 0.438 0.19 0.01** 0.42
87 0.09* 0.285 0.42 0.01** 0.78
35 0.91 0.328 0.57 0.56 0.07*
coeﬃcient on Aid/GDP from individual reduced form regressions in which
the corresponding probability that the true parameter is equal to zero;
us in LIML and IPWLS only; “Endog. test” reports the probability from a
gives the probability associated with the Hansen-J statistic from a LIML
e set of control variables (see text) and employ robust standard errors.
rces.
12 WORLD DEVELOPMENTto GDP ratio and, in the adjacent cell, the estimated probabil-
ity that the true parameter estimate equals zero. These corre-
spond to results from individual regressions in which the
row variable is the outcome of interest. Thus, for the growth
outcome, the results are extracted directly from the corre-
sponding columns of Table 1.
Complementing the positive aid–growth result, we ﬁnd that
aid reduces poverty but leaves inequality unaﬀected on aver-
age. While there are some diﬀerences between the LIML and
IPWLS estimators as regards the statistical signiﬁcance of
these results, in part reﬂecting the limitations of the data,
the magnitude, and direction of the estimates are highly
consistent. Moreover, this pattern is in keeping with the theo-
retical relation between growth, poverty, and inequality
(Bourguignon, 2003). In addition, the results show that aid
inﬂows are associated with a decline in the weight of agricul-
ture in GDP, implying that aid stimulates relatively more
rapid growth of non-agricultural sectors. Indeed, the IPWLS
estimates (and OLS) indicate a corresponding increase in
industry’s GDP share; however, the impact on services is more
ambiguous. 9
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 2 report additional test sta-
tistics. First are results from Durbin–Wu–Hausman v2 tests,
where the null hypothesis is that the aid variable can be treated
as exogenous. 10 For four of the seven outcome variables the
test is rejected, suggesting that concerns surrounding the end-
ogeneity of aid are signiﬁcant. This is notably the case for both
growth and poverty, one explanation being that these vari-
ables are used directly by donors to decide how much aid to
provide. However, the same test is not rejected for the three
other variables, implying the corresponding OLS results are
both consistent and eﬃcient. The ﬁnal column gives the prob-
ability from Hansen-J over-identiﬁcation tests, based on the
same regression speciﬁcation in the LIML column, but
employing three aggregated instruments for aid instead ofTable 3. Summary of reduced form results for relation
N OLS Pr.
Investment (% GDP) 78 0.319 0.00***
Consumption (% GDP) 78 0.174 0.24
Government (% GDP) 78 0.513 0.00***
Revenue, excluding grants (% GDP) 69 0.470 0.03**
Health expend., public (% GDP) 78 0.403 0.10
Education expend., public (% GDP) 76 0.485 0.00***
Military expenditure (% GDP) 77 0.387 0.11
Av. years total schooling, 15+ 72 0.206 0.10
Av. years primary schooling, 15+ 72 0.267 0.04**
Av. years secondary schooling, 15+ 72 0.006 0.97
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 78 0.087 0.09*
Infant mortality rate 75 0.055 0.52
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 75 0.101 0.23
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 78 0.216 0.01***
Fertility rate (births/woman) 77 0.053 0.47
Consumer price inﬂation (%) 77 0.114 0.34
Real interest rate (%) 77 0.017 0.95
Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) 78 0.053 0.61
Notes: Each cell of columns OLS, LIML, and IPWLS reports the standardized
the row variable enters as the dependent variable; adjacent columns report
estimation method is indicated by the column headings; aid treated as endogeno
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test that aid can be treated as exogenous; “Hansen-J”
regression using three aggregated instruments; all regressions include the sam
Source: authors’ calculations; see Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions and sou
* Signiﬁcance: 0.1
** Signiﬁcance: 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance: 0.01.the single generated aid instrument (see Section 2). A signiﬁ-
cant result (<10%) is ground to reject the joint null hypothesis
that the instruments are valid, meaning they are uncorrelated
with the estimated regression residuals. This test is passed
comfortably in all cases except for the Gini coeﬃcient. On
the one hand, this may be taken to imply that both the OLS
and instrumental variables (LIML, IPWLS) point estimates
for the Gini are biased. On the other hand, this may be spuri-
ous—assuming the tests are independent, the probability that
the Hansen-J test is passed at the 10% level in all seven cases is
less than one in two, even if the null hypothesis is always true.
Table 3 reports reduced form results for the eﬀect of Aid/
GDP on the chosen set of intermediate outcomes, adopting
the same format as Table 2. Again, the pattern of results is
broadly consistent with a view that aid has a positive develop-
mental impact on average. For instance, aid is associated with
a larger investment share as well as a higher share of govern-
ment consumption and government revenues in GDP. The lat-
ter measure excludes income from grants and therefore
suggests a positive impact of aid on tax income. Estimates
for sub-components of government spending indicate that
aid boosts expenditure in social sectors, especially education.
As discussed further in Section 4, the impact of aid on a
number of key social outcomes corroborates positive results
in previous studies. We ﬁnd that aid has a positive causal eﬀect
on average years of schooling, and secondary schooling in par-
ticular, likely operating through the government expenditure
channel discussed in the preceding paragraph. Further, the
signs of the estimated coeﬃcients on health outcomes clearly
point to a positive developmental contribution of aid even
though the estimated impact of aid on government health
expenditure is insigniﬁcant. The LIML estimates on the health
outcomes also slightly exceed conventional signiﬁcance levels
in most cases; nonetheless, the IPWLS estimates for both
infant mortality and life expectancy are statistically signiﬁcant.ships between Aid/GDP and intermediate outcomes
LIML Pr. IPWLS Pr. Endog. test Hansen-J
0.795 0.03** 0.357 0.16 0.15 0.73
0.515 0.25 0.779 0.05** 0.07* 0.70
0.758 0.06* 0.873 0.05* 0.51 0.03**
2.362 0.00*** 1.188 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.39
0.363 0.36 0.610 0.23 0.91 0.21
1.423 0.00*** 1.644 0.00*** 0.01** 0.18
0.361 0.32 0.255 0.65 0.94 0.37
1.010 0.04** 0.511 0.08* 0.03** 0.96
0.673 0.13 0.246 0.28 0.33 0.97
1.476 0.03** 0.818 0.04** 0.00*** 0.68
0.187 0.16 0.329 0.06* 0.02** 0.33
0.306 0.17 0.434 0.06* 0.09* 0.46
0.320 0.15 0.297 0.14 0.04** 0.44
0.162 0.40 0.116 0.57 0.02** 0.97
0.344 0.09* 0.102 0.49 0.12 0.05*
0.677 0.18 0.793 0.21 0.07* 0.70
0.488 0.37 0.199 0.70 0.36 0.27
0.009 0.98 0.360 0.51 0.90 0.69
coeﬃcient on Aid/GDP from individual reduced form regressions in which
the corresponding probability that the true parameter is equal to zero;
us in LIML and IPWLS only; “Endog. test” reports the probability from a
gives the probability associated with the Hansen-J statistic from a LIML
e set of control variables (see text) and employ robust standard errors.
rces.
ASSESSING FOREIGN AID’S LONG RUN CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 13It should be recalled, however, that the outcome data
employed here are of mixed quality and coverage. This is likely
to inﬂate the imprecision of our results. This concern is partic-
ularly present in relation to ﬁndings for the monetary and
ﬁnancial sector indicators. These results are ambiguous, sug-
gesting no evidence of a systematic eﬀect of aid on inﬂation,
real interest rates, or credit to the private sector. However,
since these outcomes are particularly noisy and poorly scaled,
these results should not be given too strong an interpretation.
Finally, the test statistics in the ﬁnal two columns of Table 3
broadly follow the pattern of Table 2. For nearly two thirds of
the intermediate outcomes we must reject the null hypothesis
that aid is exogenous (at conventional signiﬁcance levels of
<10%). Thus, although aid may not be endogenous for all pos-
sible outcomes, such endogeneity needs to be taken seriously
when considering intermediate outcomes—i.e., ex ante, aid
cannot be assumed to be exogenous. With respect to the valid-
ity of the generated aid instrument, we cannot reject the null of
the Hansen-J test for the large majority of outcomes, the two
exceptions being government size and fertility rates. Again,
assuming the tests are independent, the probability that the
Hansen-J test is passed at the 5% level in all 18 cases is less
than 40%, even if the null hypothesis is always true. Overall,
therefore, the instrument performs well and there are no clear
grounds on which to reject its suitability.
(b) Sensitivity and falsiﬁcation tests
How sensitive are these results to alternative assumptions?
While a battery of tests is possible, we focus on three speciﬁc
aspects. The ﬁrst involves application of a quantile regression
estimator, evaluated at the median of the conditional outcomeTable 4. Summary of sensitivity tests for e
Outcome Estim. Speciﬁcation
Baseline
Beta
Growth (per capita) Q-reg 0.58* (0
LIML 0.64* (0
IPWLS 0.61** (0
Poverty count ($2 a day) Q-reg 0.54* (0
LIML 0.47* (0
IPWLS 0.44 (0
Revenue, excl. (% GDP) Q-reg 1.73*** (0
LIML 2.36*** (0
IPWLS 1.19*** (0
Investment (% GDP) Q-reg 0.83** (0
LIML 0.80** (0
IPWLS 0.36 (0
Life expectancy (years) Q-reg 0.08 (0
LIML 0.19 (0
IPWLS 0.33* (0
Infant mortality rate Q-reg 0.35* (0
LIML 0.31 (0
IPWLS 0.43* (0
Av. years total schooling Q-reg 0.52** (0
LIML 1.01** (0
IPWLS 0.51* (0
Notes: “Outcome” is the dependent variable; “Estim.” indicates the regression
regression (50th percentile). “Baseline” speciﬁcation is as per that used in Tab
growth on the RHS; “Pop. control” includes population (in millions) on the R
robust standard errors in parentheses; all variables are standardized.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions and sou
* Signiﬁcance: 0.1.
** Signiﬁcance: 0.05.
*** Signiﬁcance: 0.01.distribution, which is less sensitive to outliers than OLS meth-
ods or its instrumental variables analogs. To address the end-
ogeneity of aid, a two step approach is adopted. In the ﬁrst
stage a quantile regression is run of observed Aid/GDP
against the generated instrument and all other covariates
employed in the model. The second stage, also estimated via
a quantile estimator, is the outcome regression of interest
which uses predicted values from the ﬁrst stage in place of
raw Aid/GDP. 11 Second, due to the concern that the reduced
form results may incorporate eﬀects that occur through
income growth (e.g., aid! growth! education), it is helpful
to include growth on the RHS. This essentially “blocks” all
paths to the outcome variable that arise via changes in income.
Third, we include raw population size on the RHS of the spec-
iﬁcation. The rationale for this is that the generated aid instru-
ment depends on the relative population sizes of the donors to
recipients. As Clemens and Bazzi (2009) argue, there are rea-
sons to believe that population is a direct determinant of
growth (and perhaps other key outcomes), which might inval-
idate the instrument. Thus, by including population on the
RHS of the outcome regression we allow any such direct
eﬀects to be incorporated. 12
The results from the sensitivity tests are summarized in
Table 4. As in previous tables, only the estimated coeﬃcient
on the Aid/GDP variable is reported alongside standard errors
(in parentheses). Results for diﬀerent estimators are indicated
by abbreviations; the diﬀerent speciﬁcations are in the col-
umns, where the baseline speciﬁcation is unchanged from ear-
lier models. The broad ﬁnding from these tests is that both the
direction and magnitude of the eﬀects of aid are unchanged.
For instance, the estimated aid–growth eﬀect is 0.58 using a
quantile instrumental variables regression and 0.68 using bothﬀects of Aid/GDP on various outcomes
Growth control Pop. control
s.e. Beta s.e. Beta s.e.
.34) . . 0.82** (0.35)
.38) . . 0.81* (0.48)
.29) . . 0.68** (0.33)
.28) 0.55** (0.26) 0.86*** (0.31)
.24) 0.34* (0.19) 0.55** (0.26)
.33) 0.19 (0.28) 0.45 (0.34)
.37) 1.65*** (0.40) 2.08*** (0.48)
.71) 1.82*** (0.41) 2.70*** (0.96)
.39) 0.87*** (0.33) 1.16*** (0.42)
.38) 0.96*** (0.33) 1.47*** (0.42)
.36) 0.64** (0.30) 0.93** (0.43)
.25) 0.25 (0.24) 0.40 (0.25)
.16) 0.16 (0.15) 0.37* (0.21)
.13) 0.10 (0.11) 0.23 (0.15)
.18) 0.24 (0.15) 0.35* (0.19)
.18) 0.48*** (0.17) 0.42* (0.22)
.22) 0.26 (0.19) 0.32 (0.26)
.23) 0.39* (0.22) 0.43* (0.25)
.22) 0.65** (0.28) 0.56** (0.28)
.48) 0.86** (0.41) 1.25* (0.68)
.29) 0.47 (0.29) 0.53* (0.32)
estimator employed—Q-reg is a two-step instrumental variables quantile
les 2 and 3. “Growth control” speciﬁcation includes real GDP per capita
HS. “Beta” reports the estimated coeﬃcient on Aid/GDP and “s.e.” gives
rces.
14 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthe latter estimator and controlling for population size (also
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level in both cases). While
there is some variation in the precise point estimates and stan-
dard errors, this is to be expected given the small sample size
and noisy underlying data. Two further points emerge. First,
when growth is included as a control variable on the RHS,
many of the point estimates for non-growth outcomes decline
slightly in magnitude relative to the baseline speciﬁcation. For
example, the estimated eﬀect of aid on poverty using the
LIML is  0.47 in the baseline speciﬁcation but  0.34 when
growth is controlled for. This implies that some of the impact
of aid on poverty reduction is occurring through (aggregate)
income growth. Second, the opposite tendency is found when
we control for population size. This may be due to a negative
correlation between average population and the generated aid
instrument (i.e., larger countries are expected to receive less
aid).
As noted in Section 2, the hypothesis that aid (exclusively)
aﬀects ﬁnal outcomes through proximate determinants can
be tested by including the latter covariates as controls on the
RHS. Again, this amounts to blocking the eﬀects of aid
through these channels as their eﬀect is partialled out of the
corresponding eﬀect of Aid/GDP on the chosen outcome.
Both LIML and IPWLS estimates of such augmented regres-
sions show no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of aid on growth
when life expectancy, education and investment outcomes
are included as additional control variables. This holds regard-
less of the other covariates included in the model. 13 The inter-
pretation is that a large share of estimated eﬀect of aid on
growth is likely to come through these key channels.4. INTERPRETATION
Thus far, discussion of results has concentrated on the sign
and domain of parameter estimates. It is helpful to reﬂect on
whether these ranges are plausible. This is sometimes diﬃcult
to ascertain directly from the previous tables as results were
given in standardized form. Consequently, for a selected num-
ber of ﬁnal and intermediate outcomes, Table 5 presents the
reduced form point estimates and 90% conﬁdence intervals
for the expected return to an average annual aid inﬂow equal
to 5% of GDP over the period 1970–2007 (which is slightly
greater than double the observed median Aid/GDP for all
countries in the sample; see Appendix B). We ﬁnd the long-
run impacts of aid are both plausible and material. According
to the LIML point estimates, such an aid inﬂow is expected toTable 5. Estimated increment to the long-run average level of various outcomes e
period 1970
Variable OLS
Lower Point
GDP per capita growth 0.56 0.27
Agriculture, value added (% GDP) 1.98 0.62
Poverty headcount at $1.25 a day 5.19 2.67
Investment (% GDP) 2.46 4.35
Government (% GDP) 3.22 5.72
Revenue, excluding grants (% GDP) 1.34 5.49
Av. years total schooling, 15+ 0.01 0.57
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 2.18 1.10
Infant mortality rate 4.06 2.56
Notes: The table reports the raw estimated eﬀect of a 5% Aid/GDP inﬂow
summarized in Tables 2 and 3; “lower” and “upper” refer to 90% conﬁdence
Source: Authors’ calculations; see Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions and soincrease the average annual rate of economic growth by
around 1.5 percentage points, reduce poverty by around 15
percentage points, raise the investment share of GDP by
around 11 percentage points, augment average schooling by
2.8 years, boost life expectancy at birth by 2.35 years and
reduce infant mortality by 14 in every 1,000 births. 14
Viewed together, the results show a consistent pattern that
aid has made a positive long-run developmental contribution
on average. The results concerning the impact of aid on
growth are also consistent with other research. The present
study applies the same methods developed in AJT10 to an
extended dataset, yielding highly consistent point estimates
for the aid–growth coeﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, for the equivalent
speciﬁcation and estimator, Arndt et al. (2010a) report a coef-
ﬁcient of 0.42 on aid and a standard error of 0.19 for the per-
iod 1970–2000, implying a 95% conﬁdence interval ranging
from 0.05 to 0.79. The comparable (unstandardized) coeﬃ-
cient corresponding to column III of Table 1 is 0.29, with a
standard error of 0.18. Thus, for the periods 1960–2000,
1970–2000 (estimated in AJT10) and 1970–2007 (here), the
estimated impact of aid on growth lies in a highly consistent
domain.
The reduced form results for other outcomes also are consis-
tent with previous studies. Investment is frequently identiﬁed
as a principal growth determinant (Mankiw et al., 1992;
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, & Miller, 2004), and evidence
points to (very) long-run growth eﬀects from improvements
in aggregate health (Jack & Lewis, 2009). Gomanee, Girma,
and Morrissey (2005), Masud and Yontcheva (2007) and
Mishra and Newhouse (2009) all ﬁnd positive eﬀects of certain
kinds of aid on health outcomes; while Birchler and
Michaelowa (2013) reports positive eﬀects of aid on education
enrollment rates (also Michaelowa, 2004). Similar to our falsi-
ﬁcation test, Hansen and Tarp (2001) ﬁnd that aid is not sig-
niﬁcant in a growth regression which controls for investment
and human capital, but that aid remains a signiﬁcant determi-
nant of investment. Furthermore, our results provide a basis
to reject the (largely) theoretical concerns that aid undermines
domestic revenue mobilization (e.g., Moss, Pettersson, & van
de Walle, 2006). Rather, our results are closer to those of Piv-
ovarsky, Clements, Gupta, and Tiongson (2003), who ﬁnd a
positive revenue impact from concessional loans (but a small
negative eﬀect from grants). Similarly, and contrary to con-
cerns that aid’s positive developmental impact is muted due
to its fungibility (Pack & Pack, 1993), our results corroborate
van de Walle and Mu (2007) and show that some aid “sticks”
to the social sectors and, thus, is not entirely fungible.xpected from receiving a sustained aid inﬂow equal to 5% of GDP (over the
–2007)
LIML
Upper Lower Point Upper
0.02 0.02 1.51 3.00
3.21 22.38 11.60 0.83
10.54 30.70 15.52 0.35
6.25 2.86 10.85 18.85
8.21 1.02 8.45 15.87
9.64 13.93 27.60 41.27
1.15 0.59 2.81 5.02
0.02 0.41 2.35 5.11
9.17 31.61 14.37 2.88
on selected outcome variables based on the reduced form regressions
limits; estimators indicated by column headings.
urces.
ASSESSING FOREIGN AID’S LONG RUN CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 15With respect to the link between poverty and growth, the
reduced form results enable us to derive an estimate of the
aid-induced growth semi-elasticity of poverty (GSEP). This
is given by the estimated absolute change in the poverty (head-
count) rate divided by the estimated percentage change in
mean income due to aid over the period. 15 For both the
US$1.25 and US$2 poverty measures, we ﬁnd that the aid-
induced GSEP is around 0.30 (or 0.26 and 0.31 respectively),
meaning that a 1% increase in mean income tends to lead to
a 0.30 percentage point fall in the headcount poverty rate. This
is situated just below the average of the range of GSEP esti-
mates calculated by Klasen and Misselhorn (2008, Table 7),
suggesting there is no reason to conclude that aid is any less
eﬀective in reducing poverty than other growth drivers over
the long-run.5. CONCLUSIONS
This study aimed to answer the question: “What has aid
accomplished over the past four decades?” Evidence of this
kind speaks to the ﬁrst order policy problem facing donors
(recipients)—namely, whether they should continue to provide
(accept) foreign aid. Drawing on a simple graphical illustra-
tion, we began by presenting a general structural model of
the relationship between aid and aggregate outcomes, which
is consistent with the framework employed in the literature
on growth empirics. To estimate this model, we ﬁrst calculated
reduced form estimates of the relationship between aid and
ﬁnal outcomes. The results conﬁrm a robust positive impact
of aid on growth for the 1970–2007 period, thereby replicating
the ﬁndings of AJT10 (and other recent studies) using an
extended dataset. The aggregate eﬀects of aid are also coher-
ent. On average and over the long-run, foreign aid reduces
poverty with no signiﬁcant impacts on inequality. Aid alsocontributes to more rapid expansion of “modern” sectors
(industry) and a relative decline of agriculture’s share in GDP.
To gain insight into relevant transmission channels, we
applied the same reduced form approach to a set of intermedi-
ate outcomes. These revealed a range of positive and signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects due to aid, including on investment, government
revenue, government spending, and social outcomes. Lastly,
we veriﬁed the sensitivity of the results to alternative estima-
tors and speciﬁcations, such as when income growth and pop-
ulation are included as regression controls. These gave no
reason to question our overall ﬁndings. Moreover, the results
suggest that the eﬀect of aid on a range of non-growth out-
comes cannot be attributed solely to the impact occurring
via income growth. These results were substantiated by a series
of falsiﬁcation tests. These suggest that investments in physical
capital and improvements in human capital are likely to be key
transmission channels through which aid promotes growth.
In summary, based on results covering a wide range of out-
comes, aid can point to a series of accomplishments with a
positive impact on the growth and development process. There
is no evidence that aid is detrimental. Aid has contributed to
economic growth by stimulating its proximate determi-
nants—e.g., physical capital accumulation and improving
human capital, particularly education and health. Overall,
the experience of the past four decades or so provide no sup-
port to the argument that aid ﬂows should cease. Moreover,
the present analysis provides some guidance on the form of
assistance by highlighting both the non-growth eﬀects of aid
as well as the importance of physical and human capital accu-
mulation. Finally, considered in light of the the great expecta-
tions associated with aid in the 1960s and early 1970s, the
magnitude of the estimated eﬀects of aid are generally moder-
ate but become material over the long-run. It follows that aid
should not be considered a panacea or silver-bullet for stimu-
lating growth and development.NOTES1. For discussion and application of this approach to the analysis of
foreign aid see Arndt et al. (2011).
2. The convention adopted here is that lower case Latin letters represent
individual random variables, while upper case letters refer to vectors of
random variables.
3. See for example: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/crsguide.
4. The practice of using the endpoint level is encountered in the cross-
country growth regression literature where ﬁnal income can be used in
place of the growth rate, and initial income is dropped from the RHS (e.g.,
Mankiw et al., 1992).
5. Purchasing power parity corrections go some way to address this, but
these face acute challenges in accurately adjusting for diﬀerences in the
cost of public service provision. For discussion see http://go.world-
bank.org/I0AHGSYF80.
6. The distinction between these types of outcomes is not important from
a technical point of view and there may be some debate as to
classiﬁcations. Nonetheless, corresponding to the logic of production
functions, this terminology is retained for clarity of exposition.
7. For reference, detailed results pertaining to each of the reduced form
models can be found in Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2013, Appendix C).8. Some of the outcomes considered in Tables 2 and 3 are bound in
certain ways (e.g., above zero and/or below 100 for percentage of GDP
outcomes). However, none of the observations in the data set lie on or
even particularly close to these bounds. Consequently, no speciﬁc
techniques are employed to take censoring into account.
9. It is not possible to say whether this result is driven by aid speciﬁcally
targeted at industry or whether other mechanisms are at play. Further
research will be of use to shed light here.
10. Implemented in Stata via the endog () option of the ivreg2
command used to estimate the LIML results.
11. This follows the logic of a TSLS estimator. The quantile regression
estimator used is the native qreg command available in Stata v11
estimated at the 50th percentile, with variance–covariance matrix
estimated using a bi-weight kernel. See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for
an overview of this estimator.
12. As shown by Clemens and Bazzi (2009), logged population is critical
for the strength of the generated instrument (see Eqn. (1)). To avoid this
concern raw population size is employed, thereby controlling for some
(not all) population-related eﬀects while also maintaining instrument
strength.
13. Detailed results are available on request from the authors.
16 WORLD DEVELOPMENT14. These eﬀects refer to the expected change in the average of the
outcome variable over the full period—i.e., the diﬀerence in the average
for that variable versus its counterfactual average.
15. Calculated as GSEP ¼ bp=½ð1þ bgÞ37  1, where bp is the estimated
coeﬃcient onAid/GDP in the reduced form aid-poverty regression and bg is
the estimated coeﬃcient on Aid/GDP in the reduced form aid–growthregression (appropriately scaled). Note that the latter coeﬃcient estimates
the expected increase in the average annual growth rate over the period
1970–2007, while the former estimates the expected overall change in the
poverty rate due to aid over the same timeframe. Consequently, to compare
like with like, we need to calculate the expected overall percentage change in
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ASSESSING FOREIGN AID’S LONG RUN CONTRIBUTION TO GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 17APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIALThis appendix provides a more technical exposition of the link
between Figure 1 and feasible empirical approaches for identify-
ing the relation between aid and either intermediate or ﬁnal out-
comes. The starting point, following Pearl (2009), is to note that
as a DAG the same graph has a corresponding non-parametric
structural equation representation. Assuming the functions are
autonomous, the ﬁgure corresponds to Eqns. (A.1)–(A.4) below.
v ¼ fvðT ; uvÞ ðA:1Þ
a ¼ faðv; T ; uaÞ ðA:2Þ
xm ¼ fxðw; T ; uxmÞ ðA:3Þ
y ¼ fyðT ;X ; uyÞ ðA:4Þ
and where it is additionally assumed:
E½uvuj ¼ 0 8 j 2 J ¼ fa; x1; x2 . . . ; xM ; yg
E½ujuk – 0 8 j; k 2 J :
These are general expressions from which empirical speciﬁca-
tions used in the applied growth literature can be derived as
special cases (e.g., using additive errors). For instance, deﬁning
y in Eqn. (A.4) as aggregate GDP growth, this maps directly to
the standard equation specifying growth as a function of initial
and steady state income Mankiw et al. (1992). That is, T con-APPENDIX B. SUMMARY STATIST
The table below summarizes the variables used in the analysis, t
(with source-variable reference code where available). Please see t
N Median M
Aid variables
Aid/GDP 78 2.28
Aid per capita 78 26.64 3
Generated aid instrument 78 62.52 6
Final outcomes
Real GDP growth per capita 78 1.68
Agriculture, value added (% GDP) 76 20.65 2
Industry, value added (% GDP) 76 29.63 2
Services, etc., value added (% GDP) 76 48.72 4
Poverty headcount at $2 a day 64 43.30 4
Poverty headcount at $1.25 a day 64 21.65 2
Gini index 65 44.19 4
Intermediate outcomes
Investment in real GDP 78 17.18 1
Private consumption in real GDP 78 68.36 7
Government consumption in real GDP 78 16.60 1
Revenue, excluding grants (% GDP) 69 19.95 2
Health expend., public (% GDP) 78 2.67
Education expend., public (% GDP) 76 3.76
Military expenditure (% GDP) 77 1.91
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 78 60.96 5
Infant mortality rate 75 67.48 7
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 78 11.05 1
Fertility rate (births/woman) 77 4.66
Consumer price inﬂation (%) 77 10.31 5
Real interest rate (%) 77 6.58
Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP) 78 23.74 2
Av. years total schooling, 15+ 72 4.89
Av. years primary schooling, 15+ 72 3.64tains initial income as well as various ﬁxed factors that aﬀect
long-run productivity, while X ¼ ðx1; x2; . . . ; xMÞ contains prox-
imate time-varying factors, such as the rate of accumulation of
human and physical capital that also aﬀect steady state income.
The key assumption of the system is that ðuvjT Þ 
ðua; ux; uy jT Þ. This means that the eﬀect of aid on a chosen ele-
ment xm, or on y, can be recovered indirectly as the ratio of
causal eﬀects due to v. As noted by Balke and Pearl (1997),
however, this is only feasible with the additional assumption
that the underlying functional forms are linear, such that error
terms are additive. This can be seen algebraically by taking the
reduced form associated with Eqns. (A.3) and (A.4):
y ¼ fyðT ;X ; uyÞ
¼ fyð½fxða; T ; ux1Þ; . . . ; fxða; T ; uxM Þ; T ; uyÞ
¼
XM
m¼1
a½b1maþ T 0b2m þ uxm  þ T 0cþ uy
¼ ~kaþ T 0~lþ ~u ðA:5Þ
where the tilde superscripts denote aggregated parameters.
Multiplying (A.5) through by v, taking expectations and rear-
ranging, yields an instrumental variables estimand:
dy=da ¼ Covðv; yjT Þ=Covðv; ajT Þ. The reduced form eﬀect of
aid on, say, x1 can be estimated analogously: dx1=da ¼
Covðv; x1jT Þ=Covðv; ajT Þ.
ICS AND VARIABLE SOURCES
he measurement scale employed, and the original data sources
he notes at the end of the table for further details.
ean St. dev Scale Source Reference code
3.49 3.77 [A] [1] –
6.78 44.74 [A] [1] –
2.26 12.13 [A] [2] –
1.73 1.79 [A] [3] rgdpchg
2.59 13.42 [A] [4] NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS
9.71 9.90 [A] [4] NV.IND.TOTL.ZS
7.71 9.66 [A] [4] NV.SRV.TETC.ZS
5.39 29.72 [D] [4] SI.POV.2DAY
8.35 24.03 [D] [4] SI.POV.DDAY
4.46 7.87 [D] [4] SI.POV.GINI
8.53 10.30 [A] [3] ki
0.02 19.95 [A] [3] kc
8.04 8.41 [A] [3] kg
1.66 8.82 [A] [4] GC.REV.XGRT.GD.ZS
2.89 1.39 [A] [4] SH.XPD.PUBL.ZS
3.97 1.50 [A] [4] SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS
2.34 1.70 [A] [4] MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS
9.00 9.50 [B] [4] SP.DYN.LE00.IN
1.78 35.38 [B] [4] SP.DYN.IMRT.IN
1.92 4.62 [B] [4] SP.DYN.CDRT.IN
4.68 1.38 [B] [4] SP.DYN.TFRT.IN
2.69 150.30 [A] [4] FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG
7.00 8.78 [A] [4] FR.INR.RINR
9.37 21.40 [A] [4] FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS
5.01 2.10 [B] [5] BAR.SCHL.15UP
3.49 1.42 [B] [5] BAR.PRM.SCHL.15UP
(continued on next page)
APPENDIX B—(continued)
N Median Mean St. dev Scale Source Reference code
Av. years secondary schooling, 15+ 72 1.35 1.37 0.72 [B] [5] BAR.SEC.SCHL.15UP
Control variables
Income per capita 78 7.88 7.84 0.79 [C] [6] –
Sachs–Warner trade policy index 78 0.32 0.32 0.29 [C] [6] –
Life expectancy 78 51.99 52.88 9.77 [C] [6] –
Geography 78 1.00 0.55 0.77 [C] [6] –
Ethnic fractionalization 78 0.54 0.47 0.29 [C] [6] –
Primary eduction enrollment rate 78 0.67 0.65 0.29 [C] [7] p60
Coastal population density 78 30.36 101.25 358.82 [C] [7] dens65c
Malaria prevalence index 78 0.54 0.51 0.43 [C] [7] sa_mr
Price of investment goods 78 85.83 93.68 62.20 [C] [7] iprice1
Civil liberties 78 0.33 0.41 0.27 [C] [7] civ72
Air distance to major cities 78 8.47 8.41 0.50 [C] [7] airdist
Oil producer 78 0.00 0.36 0.48 [C] [7] oildummy
Landlocked 78 0.00 0.21 0.41 [C] [7] landlock
Prevalence of HIV (% of pop 15–49) 68 0.80 3.12 5.70 [D] [4] SH.DYN.AIDS.ZS
Scales: [A] full period mean (1970–2007); [B] average of earliest start and latest end values; [C] initial value (1960s or early 1970s if the former unavailable);
[D] latest end value only;
Sources: [1] Authors’ calculations from OECD-DAC (www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline; downloaded May 2009); [2] authors’ estimates based on the
method set out in Arndt et al. (2010a, 2010b), using updated and cleaned OECD-DAC dataset; [3] Penn World Tables v6.3 (http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu) [4]
World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog; downloaded April 20, 2010); [5]
World Bank, Education Statistics (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog; downloaded April 20, 2010); [6] Arndt et al. (2010a, 2010b); [7] Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004).
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